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 标    题: 算法行政对自由裁量权的影响:正向规制、负向限缩与动态平衡(2023 第2卷 第3期 10)
作       者:

张会平 曹景伟

文章栏目:

智慧城市

摘       要:

算法决策与公共行政的深度融合催生出算法行政这一新型行政模式,政府权力结构在全新的行政模式下产生了适应性变化,公职人员的自由裁量权呈现出向算法流动的趋势。基于权力配置视角,从正向规制和负向限缩两个维度分析算法行政对公职人员自由裁量权的影响。一方面,算法嵌入公共治理领域会使公共部门和公职人员基于技术执行逻辑将自由裁量权进行分置和让渡,算法基于“技术中立”的决策模型对自由裁量权滥用产生正向规制作用;另一方面,过度的权力让渡加之算法影子官僚的权力攫取会对公职人员的自由裁量权产生负向限缩作用,公职人员的主体性可能逐渐褪化沦为屏幕官僚,裁量问责机制也会由于权责模糊而遭受冲击。最后,提出多元主体实现权力制约与动态平衡的路径,即从自由裁量权分置、让渡、攫取三个方面出发,寻找公共部门、公职人员以及算法之间的“主体间性”,既有效发挥算法的工具价值,也要避免公共部门和公职人员的主体地位被架空。

关  键  词:

算法行政;自由裁量权;权力配置;公职人员

Abstract:

The deep integration of algorithmic decision-making and public administration has spawned a new administrative model of algorithmic administration. The government power structure has undergone adaptive changes under the new administrative model, and the discretion of public officials has shown a trend of flowing to the algorithm. From the perspective of power allocation, this paper analyzes the impact of algorithmic administration on the discretion of public officials from the two dimensions of positive regulation and negative restriction. On the one hand, the algorithm embedded in the field of public governance will enable the public sector and public officials to divide and transfer discretion based on the logic of technical execution. The decision-making model based on ' technology neutrality ' has a positive regulatory effect on the abuse of discretion. On the other hand, excessive power transfer and the power grabbing of algorithmic shadow bureaucrats will have a negative limiting effect on the discretion of public officials. The subjectivity of public officials will gradually fade and become screen bureaucrats, and the discretionary accountability mechanism will also be affected by the ambiguity of power and responsibility. On this basis, this paper puts forward the path of realizing power restriction and dynamic balance among multiple subjects. Starting from the three dimensions of discretion division, transfer and grab, we can find the "intersubjectivity" among public departments, public officials and algorithms, which can not only effectively play the instrumental value of algorithms, but also avoid the dominant position of public departments and public officials from being overhead.

Keywords:

Algorithm Administration, Discretion, Power Allocation, Public Officials

作者简介:

张会平,电子科技大学公共管理学院教授、博士生导师,Email:zhanghuiping @uestc.edu.cn;

曹景伟,电子科技大学公共管理学院硕士研究生。

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